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KEYNOTE ADDRESS TRANSCRIPT 
REED E. HUNDT* 
 
REED HUNDT:  Thank you all for inviting me.  This is a re-
turn engagement, which I never have. But I know so much 
about my classmate Dean Joan Wexler that if there is anyone 
here who would like an office assignment or something like 
that, I can help. But I do honor what she’s doing here, and I’m 
sorry I haven’t been able to visit with her. 
This is the most grandiose title that I was able to think of: 
“The Rule of Telecom Law in the 21st Century.”  I was thinking 
of saying “in the next millennium,” but I think the century will 
do.  So I thought this would take about twenty minutes to 
cover. 
Your Professor Paul Schwartz is the best reviewer of my 
book, the only really good reviewer, that I had with this book 
that had a very tiny circulation. Sales have been flagging.  So I 
thought that I would take plenty of time to pay attention to my 
book here. 
It ought to be assigned, everywhere in the world. I just got an 
e-mail from my publisher who asked if I would agree that it 
could be translated into Japanese for $100 due to the strength 
of the dollar vis-à-vis the yen.  But that’s okay, I said yes.  And 
then I got an e-mail from the translator in Japan.  The Internet 
is really great, but I’m a little worried about the way this book 
is going to come across.  The translator e-mailed the following:  
“What exactly is the Federal Communications Commission?   Is 
it a business and can you buy its stock?” The answer is, in a 
manner of speaking — that is the story of the book.  Anyhow, 
we’re not going to re-translate the Japanese back to the Eng-
lish, if any of you do want to assign this book in its original be-
ginnings, you can still get copies from the remainderman. 
  
*   Senior Advisor, McKinsey & Co., Inc.; Chairman, Federal Communications 
Commission (1993-1997).  Mr. Hundt is the author of the recently released 
book You Say You Want a Revolution: A Story of Information Age Politics 
(2000). 
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I left the FCC at the end of 1997 and like Rip Van Winkle, I 
just went to sleep, and I woke up here today, and the NASDAQ 
is up and the Dow is up and there doesn’t seem to be anything 
to worry about.  And yet everyone is overcome by misery with 
respect to both of these indices. In the beginning of the year 
2000, the telecom sector of the American economy began to 
drop.  It actually played a very big role in dragging down the 
S&P 500, just as the information sector and telecom in particu-
lar within that sector pushed it up in the previous two years. 
There’s nothing about this story that has made anyone 
happy.  I’ve been on the boards of five companies that have 
gone bankrupt or closed their doors in this time period.  They 
were all start-ups, they all had very interesting ideas, and they 
all ran out of money.  As mentioned, I am fortunate to be on the 
board of Intel, which during the worst year for semi-conductors 
in history, made $1 billion in profit.  If you’re very, very big and 
you have tremendous scale, you can cope.  But if you’re not so 
big and you haven’t achieved economies of scale, you can’t cope.  
This is a very simple thing to say that has the merit of being 
true about the telecom sector: many of the companies that have 
collapsed had never gotten to the economies of scale necessary 
to run their businesses.  
Here is an obituary list for the sector.  There are twenty-two 
companies on it.  I knew most of the CEO’s of these companies.  
They raised in debt and equity totaling $95 billion — that’s 
actual dollars received in the company — and in these cases 
they spent all that money.  At the peak of the market, these 
companies collectively had a $260 billion market cap.  That 
means that they were worth almost as much as the incumbent 
former monopolists in telecom.  Not quite as much, but in the 
same order of magnitude. 
The view was that the attackers were going to be able to 
build the networks with very, very low costs, much lower than 
the incumbents; they were going to be able to take market 
share hand-over-fist; they were the new wave of innovators and 
they were going to replace the old — and now all the money’s 
gone. Some other things have happened in this time period.  
Some people made money.  In the time period from the begin-
ning of the 1990’s to the beginning of this decade, American 
households sold on a net basis, $1 trillion of stock.  That’s a lot 
of cashing out by American households, and that is one of the 
reasons why the consumer sector has fought so valiantly 
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against the downturn and why our recession on a macro basis 
hasn’t been that significant.  All that cash has created a tre-
mendous reservoir of consumer spending which you’re continu-
ing to see be tapped. 
Now, of course, the paper wealth in these households has 
greatly declined.  You heard Alan Greenspan making that 
point, worrying about the negative wealth effect, this week. 
The question raised is whether our regulatory policies in the 
United States, which we have fought for on the global level all 
through the 1990’s, were wrong.  Have they led to this boom 
and this bust?  Did they precipitate the bubble?  Were we at 
the FCC really the [Dutch] Tulip Commission?  That is the 
question that is presented.  I don’t think that it does any good 
to pretend the question is not bouncing around.     
Yesterday I got back from Poland, where I was trying to sell 
my book the previous three days. It hasn’t been translated into 
Polish yet either, and based on my remarks I don’t think it’s 
going to be.  The big question in Poland was this: Were they, 
because they didn’t adopt these reforms, lucky?  Have they had 
their scalp creased by a bullet? Are they warned now that they 
should retain regulations that promote the Polish telephone 
monopoly? Was that really the lesson to be learned from all 
this history? 
This discussion in Poland led to still another discussion, 
which is the most important discussion in Poland and many of 
the Eastern European countries.  What do they do about the 
fact that they have, plus or minus a few points, about 20% un-
employment?  If you graduate from school today in one of the 
former communist bloc countries, your odds of getting a decent 
job are maybe 50/50. There are no jobs in the manufacturing 
sector for these folks.  Poland either becomes a service economy 
fairly quickly, or in the long run they won’t have a competitive 
economy at all.  [Charts presented]. 
So this chart is about fundamental demand.  What this chart 
says is that consumers have paid more money and devoted a 
greater percent of their wallets, to communications services 
steadily through the 1990’s.   
And what have they bought?  They’ve bought things that 
didn’t previously exist to be bought.  They’ve bought a wide-
spread variety of wireless services, narrowband Internet access 
that you dial up to, at around fifty kilobytes a second.  They’ve 
bought broadband, one and a half megabits a second.  They 
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bought vertical services, the batch of extra line items on your 
bill that in fact practically doubles the average telephone bill in 
the United States.  People are paying more for more.  That’s 
why this is a growth sector. That’s why we’re a successful ser-
vice economy. 
This underlying demand is continuing at a staggering rate.  
Cable TV is an industry that was built under the United States 
decision that it would be lawful to have monopolies — to 
achieve economies of scale. But the cable growth is essentially 
correlated to the GDP, which is not bad, but not eye-popping.  
However, when you look at the new services driven by the 
Internet, and the use of the existing networks through the new 
technologies that are associated with the Internet, the growth 
rates are prodigious.  After the Twin Towers were attacked, 
you may have read, there were 1.2 billion instant messages 
sent within the AOL community alone that very day.  Five or 
six per person in the United States.  IM is a service that didn’t 
exist a handful of years previously.   
In the thirty-eight years after the telephone began to be de-
ployed in the 1890’s, 10% penetration was achieved.  Cable TV 
took thirty years for 10% penetration under the monopoly para-
digm.  By contrast, narrowband is the fastest growing commu-
nications service in history. In two years, 10% of the United 
States had adopted the Internet.   
There’s one fundamental reason.  The regulatory policy of the 
United States was to create the lowest input costs for Internet 
service providers of any country in the world by a factor of ten 
to 100.  Let’s say that same thing another way, because it’s so 
incredibly important.  We consciously decided in the United 
States to have Internet service providers be able to borrow the 
existing networks at very, very, very low costs.  By regulation, 
we obliged the proprietors of those networks — the telephone 
companies for the most part — to sell on a wholesale basis the 
use of their network to Internet service providers at a very low 
incremental cost.  
The result was that almost overnight 5000 Internet service 
providers sprung into being in the United States. One of them 
was called AOL.  There was a tremendous winnowing process 
that went on here.  But by and large, this huge industry, grow-
ing like Kudzu vines, shrinking like Darwin might have imag-
ined, created massive penetration.  In the exact same time pe-
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riod, the regulators in Asia, particularly Japan, made the exact 
opposite decisions and produced the opposite results. 
It cost 100 times more in Japan to be an Internet service 
provider, in the early years of the Net, than it did the United 
States.  And ten times more in Europe.  That’s the reason why 
in Japan, Internet household penetration, as of six months ago 
I think, was under 10%.  It’s about 56% in the United States.  
First, if you’ve read about NTT Docomo, the wireless company, 
sending all these different messages, remember it’s nine kilo-
bytes a seconds. That’s one-sixth of what narrowband access is 
in the United States.  And second, it is popular because you 
don’t get the Internet in many places except through that tech-
nology in Japan.  The reason is that the parent company, the 
existing telephone company, charges so much to ISPs that 
comparatively few thrive.  
In the U.S. we purposely created a new mass medium called 
the Internet.  That’s the reason the Internet is in English.  It 
didn’t start out that everybody said this Net is going to be in 
English.  That is what I started out with in my book, if I ha-
ven’t mentioned my book lately. 
Broadband is the second fastest growing communications 
service in history.  The United States has more broadband us-
ers, the last time I looked, than in all the other developed coun-
tries added together. Our percentage is lower than South Ko-
rea, which has adopted the American narrowband policies to 
broadband, meaning they built the facilities and obliged that 
they be made available at almost no cost to any broadband pro-
vider. They lowered the input cost and created a competitive 
market so that the output at the retail level is very, very low, 
and they have 45% household penetration for broadband as a 
result of that. 
Do regulatory policies matter?  They are one of the top two 
most important considerations, the other being the capital 
markets.  And that’s always been true.  This is what we’ve 
learned in the last few years.  We’ve learned that when you 
talk about communications services you should talk about four 
different demographic groups: big businesses, small businesses, 
mobile or wireless users, and then household residents. What 
we’ve learned is that each of these “buckets” actually calls for a 
different set of services.  There’s intense competition for some 
of these services in some of these areas, and in other areas 
there isn’t. 
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So we’ve gotten smarter about understanding the business.  
The corollary is that there ought to be a different regulatory 
policy for each of these groups, which we did not recognize as a 
country a few years ago, and that isn’t the way the law is writ-
ten.  When you talk about the future you need to look into the 
world of opportunity.  What we’ve learned is that our legal and 
regulatory policies ought to be shaped around the future, not 
about the past. We ought not to have this spate of regulation 
and judicial decisions that reflect and help cause stock market 
decline.  We ought to have decisions about what is the right 
paradigm to approach all of the stuff that hasn’t yet been done. 
About 70% of households in Europe lack Internet access – 
45% in the U.S.  And 56% of U.S. consumers don’t have a cell 
phone yet.  These are the services that have yet to be sold.  If 
you do a demographic analysis, you see that unless there are 
ways for the services to be priced at lower levels, or to have 
more value per dollar, we’re not going to increase penetration.  
There’s no question that the Internet is going to shape the fu-
ture.  I just want to point this out.  What wireless LAN and 
free high-speed data means is that in about three years every 
PC is going to have embedded in it — at a cost of about a penny 
to you the consumer — a chip that is going to mean that if we 
ever go in a room where someone has installed (talk about bad 
branding) an “802.11 hub site,” then you are automatically go-
ing to be on the Internet. 
This is what it means.  Within three years everybody walk-
ing around with a PC, every time they go to Starbucks, they’re 
going to be automatically on the Internet.  They probably aren’t 
going to be paying for it.  It’ll probably be in the price of the cup 
of coffee.  That means that the mobile telephone industry that 
you know today isn’t going to be the mobile telephone industry 
of three years from now.  They’re either going to adapt to this 
change or not.  But if we’re talking about regulation and law, 
what should they do in Poland, what should we do differently 
here, then the number one thing that I’ve learned in the last 
several years is this: You have to have a vision about where 
technology is going and you have to have a point of view about 
whether you want regulation, to try to stop it (a hopeless ef-
fort), or try to embrace it in some way, in a manner consistent 
with the national interest.  
For example, maybe the right thing to do is to have innova-
tive, constructive technologies not just for the sake of change —  
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although, maybe that is a sufficient reason — but for the dif-
ferent reason which is they’re more efficient, they produce more 
services at a lower price, they produce higher productivity 
gains and they create a wealthier economy.  If you don’t have a 
wealthier economy, you can’t talk about education and health 
care, social security, and military defense. 
So in Poland, they’re talking about the telephone company, 
and I was very struck by the following that one of my McKinsey 
colleagues shared with these folks:  China was so committed to 
catching up in the 1990’s, that they built one Bell-telephone-
company-size phone network every year for the decade.  Every 
single year.  And now they have millions of telephone lines that 
they believe are stranded assets, that no one is ever going to 
use efficiently.  They built yesterday’s technology.  They didn’t 
build to what, in fact, is the overtaking technology, which is 
wireless phones, and they absolutely did not build an Internet 
network.   
So this is what happens when the state  decides either to close 
a particular monopoly or establish regulatory protection; or 
alternatively just to make the investment decisions itself.  
That’s a staggering amount of money perhaps wasted in a rela-
tively poor economy like China’s. Is this one of the reasons why 
China Telecom hasn’t yet gone public?  Perhaps they can’t fig-
ure out how to describe themselves to investors in some way 
that makes them look like they have the right business model. 
Of course efficiency is a terrible thing because look at what 
can happen.  Over sixteen years, long distance prices dropped 
gradually due to the introduction of a modest amount of compe-
tition by regulators. But on the private version of the Internet, 
where there’s never been any price regulation of long haul data 
transmission, the drop in price was huge over a short period of 
time.  So when you read about a Global Crossing going bank-
rupt, behind that there is a price drop of 90% in five months.  
If you’re a trader of bandwidth, like somebody in Houston, 
you’d say, “Well, if I could figure out how to trade this and 
catch those peaks, I could make a lot of money as a trader.”  
But what if you’re actually in the business of building one of 
these networks?  In February you decide to spend $100, on the 
assumption that you’re going to get your money back over time, 
and you find out by May that you’ve got to cut your revenue 
line by 92%.  We had fourteen long haul data networks built in 
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the United States in a few years.  We will end up probably with 
two, maybe three that will survive bankruptcy. 
Our government can make its contribution to the uncertain-
ties of business and to the fundamental problems of change 
that technology drives.  [Chart presented]. This is a chart that 
shows the biggest single mistake ever made by any government 
in the history of communications regulation.  This is a chart 
that shows the e ffect of the auctions of 3G Spectrum in Europe.  
This is a cash flow chart.  This is break even up here. They 
started off by selling off by auction licenses at such a high price 
and transferred so much cash so quickly in the auction sale, 
that if you look at what it will cost to build the system and 
where you will have to get in terms of cash flow to have opera-
tional break even, the bottom line is that these systems can’t 
make money.  The governments sold the spectrum at such a 
high price that they immediately put out of business any 3G 
industry in Europe.  They happened to sell it to their national 
carriers, who are fixed wire based companies, and that’s why 
all of them are now struggling to keep away from bankruptcy.  
That’s a heck of thing for a government to do, just in one de-
cision, to be able to cripple an entire industry across a conti-
nent.  At the FCC, it took many decisions for us to do that 
much harm, even according to our critics.  You cannot have a 
policy unless business is willing to spend money to make the 
policy go.  Investment is gas in the tank.  For those who are 
business historians or legal historians, telecom is going to feel 
like anything that you’ve ever read or learned about railroads 
in the United States in the 1870’s, 1880’s time period. 
So now we’ll talk about “the sunny side of the street.”  This is 
supposed to be in the future — this is the theory of the future, 
the theory advanced by the tech community — it is not a theory 
that to my knowledge is embraced anywhere in government at 
the present time.  We have a government right now in Wash-
ington that for ideological reasons doesn’t wish to be involved 
in the thought partnership with technology that existed 
through the 1990’s.  Argentina and telecom both are too far 
South for this Administration to pay attention to. 
They may be right.  They may be wrong.  But the cool theory 
is that more megabytes a second; faster, more efficient net-
works — specifically IP networks — will lead to the greater 
use, measured by message instructions per second, reflecting 
the power of your computer chip, which in turn will produce 
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new services. This means you will be able to do things with 
your computer that right now you don’t do.  You can download 
movies, you can make movies.   
Some people here have read Larry Lessig’s new book, The 
Future of Ideas.  The beginning of that book, the McGuffin that 
gets the whole plot going, is a discussion about how everybody 
ought to be able to make their own movies with their computer.    
One of the reasons that they can’t is because they don’t have 
enough megabytes per second of bandwidth to challenge the 
PC’s computing power.  The new services then would be driven 
by this increase in the MBPS, and you would have a good vir-
tuous cycle.  Instead of the vectors being negative, they would 
all be positive, and the economy would be growing again.  I’m 
going to briefly summarize the confession part — as to the mis-
takes that were made in the United States, in large part by me.  
But if you could just not pass this information on, I would be 
grateful. 
In the residential market, there was no chance of having real 
competition in the fixed wire residential market without rebal-
ancing — meaning without deregulating prices and allowing 
telephone companies to charge some price above cost.  We 
didn’t do that. We didn’t have any rebalancing.  It wasn’t in the 
1996 Telecommunications Act.  The power to set these retail 
prices is with the states.  The states have taken the FCC to the 
Supreme Court repeatedly over the jurisdictional question of 
whether the FCC could preempt the states on this.  The states 
have fought every jurisdictional issue since the telephone was 
invented.   And typically they’ve won because our Court, par-
ticularly in the last couple of decades, has been quite sensitive 
to the claim of states on jurisdictional issues.  One of the re-
sults is a lack of adequate power to have a national paradigm.   
Therefore, there is not enough competition in the residential 
market of fixed wire.   
But there’s wireless.  That’s  intermodal competition.  The 
FCC did create a competitive market in wireless, with many, 
many carriers.  It’s the most competitive market in the world, 
and competition caused the price of wireless to drop very, very 
radically so that it began to substitute for wire.  This was our 
way to pull the rug out from under those states that were try-
ing to restrict, through their pricing mechanisms, competition 
in the residential market.  And this technique will work in the 
fullness of time. 
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In the small to medium size enterprise market, unbundled 
elements work.  If you allow . . . a new entrant to borrow the 
existing company’s network, the retail prices are high enough 
so that the new entrant can afford to compete.  But Darwin 
rules.  This is a case of survival of the fittest.  There were 300 
competitive local telephone companies started in the wake of 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  There was never any ra-
tional chance for more than about four or five big ones to sur-
vive.   
Actually, I knew that.  Nobody asked me, but I did know 
that.  The reason I knew that is that a bunch of economists told 
me, and nobody was more surprised than those of us at the 
FCC to see the private equity community fund 300 CLECs.  
None of us to this day have been able to figure out what we 
could have done about it. But one idea is perhaps, contrary to 
any notion of free market behavior — we should have licensed 
the number of competitive companies so as to stop private in-
vestors from losing their minds and their money.   
The problem now is that there’s definitely a possibility that 
baby and bath water will be thrown out at the same time.  
Henry Ford was one of about 200 people who were inventing 
automobiles at the turn of the century, and it was his second 
company (the first went bankrupt) that became Ford Motor 
Company.  This is an extremely common pattern of innovation. 
There were, I think, 1000 companies in the late 19th century 
that sold sweet, dark colored syrupy drinks, and one became 
Coca-Cola and the others eventually did not exist.  Whether 
we’re willing to have this Darwinian struggle work its way out 
in telecom depends on whether the investors in Manhattan are 
treated in a way that investors have historically been treated, 
or whether this sector is exempt by government from the harsh 
downside of competition. 
Among large businesses, the buyers get the best prices in 
America that they get in any country in the world. It may sur-
prise you to know that in the large business data market, 
AT&T and WorldCom collectively have about 80% market 
share. They’ve held it through thick and thin, because it’s so 
difficult to service large businesses and because there is buying 
power.   
Among global users, we have the best story in the world.  
When you free these markets to competition, you discover un-
met demand, and it’s a fantastic story.  The nicest thing that I 
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learned in Poland is that, with competition, in five years 
they’ve completely eliminated the waiting lists for telephones, 
which used to be between five and ten years long.  That’s true 
on a global basis.  In Brazil there’s no longer a waiting list.  It 
used to be one to two years.  In none of the former communist 
bloc countries is there a significant waiting list.  It used to be 
that you had to be the son of a high-ranking party official to get 
a telephone.  And all that is gone.  The unmet demand is being 
met, and new demand is being discovered.   
Efficient universal service works, we’ve learned this in the 
last few years.  What this means is that if you give the subsidy 
money to the buyer, and let the buyer do the shopping, you get 
a really great system. 
Here’s an example.  The 1996 Telecommunications Act said 
we needed to have the Internet in every classroom in the 
United States.  The previous paradigm was to tell the service 
provider — the telephone company — to put this in the class-
room.  Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, by contrast, 
the paradigm was give the money to the school district on a 
matching grant basis, and then let the school district shop for 
the Internet.  Ninety percent of the school districts in the 
United States found money for the matching grant within two 
years, and we went from 9% penetration in classrooms — not 
just in the buildings, but in classrooms — to 84% penetration, 
in four years.  It’s the most successful universal service story in 
any kind of state-mandated activity that I can think of. 
And last but not least, we learned that everything is about 
market structure.  In wireless, we’ve had a competitive market 
structure and produced great results.  The market of long haul 
data was divided among fourteen carriers.  There was no way 
that government could save many of those people from going 
under, and that’s what’s happened.  In the local exchange and 
the cable market, the economies of scale and the network ef-
fects are so vast that it is very hard for regulators to create 
competition among rival identical networks.  
We’ve also learned that ideas matter.  So I’m just going to 
talk about the top one:  Metcalf’s Law. It is that the value of a 
network increases exponentially according to the number of 
users — meaning, if one more person joins a network, the value 
of that network increases for everyone on the network.  Or to 
put it more simply, if Paul and I can talk to each other, that’s 
great, but then we add Susan.  So if I can call her and he can 
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call her and she can call us, we’ve suddenly got many more 
lines of potential calling available.  The value of the network is 
greater for me, it is greater for him, it is greater for her . . . it 
has gone up exponentially.  So what this tells you is the bigger 
the network, the more people it reaches, the more valuable the 
network is.  That is the fundamental economic reason why the 
Internet has created so much value in the United States: be-
cause it increases value for all users.  This notion that commu-
nities increase in value as they grow larger is the fundamental 
idea behind the way the Internet works.  If it means anything, 
it must mean this: we really do want the Internet to be a mass 
medium.  
How to achieve goals is the primary question for a regulator. 
It’s almost certainly the case that we need to set, as a country, 
the goal of deregulating all retail prices.  The idea of telecom 
was that one company would be regulated, originally voluntar-
ily, to provide a “vanilla quality” product at a price that every-
body would subscribe to.   We need to recognize that if you’re 
going to embrace competition, you need to have the other side 
of it, which is to be indifferent as a country to the regulation of 
retail prices.  
We don’t regulate the price of any of the necessities of life. 
You don’t regulate the retail price of butter, DVDs, bread or 
wine, any of the necessities.  So why are we regulating the 
price of telecom services?   
There are at least two telecom services where we do not regu-
late the retail price.  One is wireless and the other is the Inter-
net.  I can’t see that any harm has come from either of those 
acts of deregulation.  But we might never be able to deregulate 
the price at which a small company can connect to a big com-
pany’s network. That’s why phones may always have to be 
regulated; otherwise the network effects for the big company 
might mean that absent inter connection, any market would 
collapse into monopoly. 
The other thing to decide is: are we going to be so eager to get 
economies of scale that we sacrifice diversity. The broadcast 
industry was regulated to guarantee diversity really until the  
administration of the present chairman, who has said he has 
less interest in doing this.  And yet I think we have to recognize 
that during the period of the most intense regulation, there 
was really one kind of audience, one notion of the ideal Ameri-
can. And you look today at the content of TV and you say 
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there’s just no question whatsoever that it is so much more 
eclectic, even in networks, than it has ever been before.  But I 
think you have to ask the question:  What is really the truth 
about diversity?  Is it pluralism or multiple ownership?  Which 
goals are those we’re really trying for?  Ownership diversity?  
Are we trying to have women and minorities own the stations?  
Lessig and others of that group would tell you that the main 
goal is to have a platform diversity, to make sure that none of 
these emerging broadband networks can design software sys-
tems that can preclude other people from inter-operating or 
interacting. 
I think we have to recognize that on TV, the news has moved 
to the right, and entertainment has gone to the left.  The news 
is much more conservative now than ever before.  The enter-
tainment is far more liberal, in a very general sense of the 
term.  You can get what I would call a liberal point of view all 
over the entertainment media, to an astonishing degree.  Look 
at shows like “West Wing.”  But that’s far less true of main-
stream media journal ism.  That’s my view. But is it important 
that the government be concerned with this particular topic? 
This is probably the most important of all these topics for a 
functioning democracy.  It’s the one that no one in government 
cares to talk about but everybody always cares about.  I’m go-
ing to leave this one as just a huge question, and I’m going to 
move directly to the international piece. 
There isn’t any doubt that globalization is a more dramatic 
phenomenon with respect to the technology information sector 
than it is with respect to any other sector of the economy.  I 
think I can say that without fear of challenge.  There are other 
sectors that are massively globalized, such as financial.  But 
the “financial services world trade organization treaty” doesn’t 
exist, whereas there is a telecom and information technology 
world trade organization.   
There is only one sector where as a matter of treaty on a 
global basis all nations are obliged to have a regulatory agency 
that follows the exact same four point precept for creating com-
petition and providing a rule of law, and that’s the communica-
tions sector.  It’s the only global treaty in which there is an in-
dependent agency that must be created in each of the sixty-
nine signatory countries.  And I was just in Poland talking to 
the first and second chairmen of their “FCC.”  Anywhere in the 
world that you go now you can find somebody who’s the first or 
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second person to have ever held that regulatory job in their 
country.  As we speak, they are trying to find lawyers, trying to 
figure out what ought to be in their codes and what ought to be 
their paradigms.  And they’re all vastly more similar than dif-
ferent.   
This is the only industry on a global basis where this com-
mon rule of law is developing in this way; so the following 
questions have to be answered, because everybody around the 
world is asking for the answers:  Is there some fundamental 
right to know with respect to content that ought to be embed-
ded in the regulatory schemes of every country?  We have, for 
example, in the United States, a number of notions kicking 
around in the administration to the effect that information 
should be precluded from the Web.  Various government agen-
cies are being ordered, as we speak, to take information off the 
Web or not to provide it on the grounds of security concerns.  
What’s the right paradigm?  We don’t actually have an answer 
to that question, and we’ve got a lot of reasons to debate it seri-
ously on all sides. But this is a question that exists in every 
country in the world, and we need answers. 
The world of capital similarly wants to know the rules of 
competition, and we absolutely need this . . . we need to have 
some notion of how we’re going to enforce on a global basis this 
particular treaty.  And this is a huge field of conversation 
where there are no answers provided yet. 
When everybody was talking about the Internet, they said: 
All of the people who get on the Internet here — and it’s 8% of 
their population — are going to the United States for their in-
formation.  They’re all getting on the Internet and traveling to 
the U.S.  They said 30% of all the international communication 
in and out of Poland is this 8% of people reading the Web in 
English in the United States.  We don’t like it.  We think that 
there ought to be a Polish Internet country, just like there’s a 
real physical Poland.  What should we do? Should we charge 
different prices so it’s too expensive for people to travel over the 
Internet to the United States?  Raise the price, limit the 
amount?  Should we have the government translate Yahoo into 
Polish?  Should we just cut the Internet off?  Should we super-
vise the websites?  They’re asking in effect:  What’s purely na-
tional here about communications?  Is it the case that there 
isn’t a national boundary?   
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The conference ended, and I was going to the airport. As I 
was driving by a wall along the road, I saw the answer.  Some-
body had spray-painted on the wall, “No borders, no nations.”  
And I thought, “well, you know, this is great,” because that ac-
tually is the answer.  Now, I didn’t say that’s the answer as a 
matter of law.  That is inevitably the answer as a matter of 
technology.  It’s not possible to look at the power of this tech-
nology and say that it has borders and that it respects nations.   
It is also the case that any particular country can adopt a na-
tional paradigm that limits the efficiency, reduces the effi-
ciency, limits the reach, shrinks the audience, creates less than 
a mass market, for these new technologies.  But they can’t alter 
the fact that the technology is a road.  There can be barriers, 
and countries certainly can so slow the rate of change that they 
will make their country poorer or make their people more dis-
contented, and many are choosing that particular path as we 
speak.  The price of the Internet in Poland is 100 times higher 
than it is in the United States as we speak.  There’s a reason 
why it’s just 8% online.  
But is that really the right choice?  It’s immensely important 
at this conference and others like it.  We continue to take the 
lead here in the U.S., and join with anybody anywhere else in 
the world and try to advance the ball, because at the other end 
of this story, in spite of the rainy weather in the market, it’s 
absolutely the case there are pots of gold from a social perspec-
tive, from a wealth creation perspective, and it’s up to us to 
find where the rainbow ends.  Thank you very much.   
